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Why and How Mental Disability Law
Developed as it Did
MICHAEL L. PERLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
If we are to come to grips with the roots of why and how mental
disability law jurisprudence developed as it has, it is absolutely essential
that we come to grips with two forces-sanism and pretextuality-that
utterly dominate and drive this area of the law.' The papers in this
symposium issue-about how we construct "craziness,"2 the therapeutic
potential of the civil commitment hearing,3 the meaning of
"dangerousness," 4 how we construct competence,5 the application of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to persons with mental disabilities,6 the
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL (forthcoming 1999).
2. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Reasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 189 (1999).
3. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37 (1999).
4. Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES_61 (1999).
5. Elyn R. Saks & Stephen Behnke, Competency to Decide on Treatment and
Research: MacArthur and Beyond, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103 (1999).
6. Susan Stefan, The Americans with Disabilities Act and Mental Health Law:
Issues for the Twenty-first Century, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 131 (1999).
ways in which mediation and alternative dispute resolution may offer a
fresh approach to "the culture of argumentation," and how that affects
mental disability law,7 deceptions in forensic testimony,8 the transfer of
juvenile cases to "adult court,"9 the use of psychiatry as a tool of
governmental oppression,' 0 and the legal relationship between the
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and the death penalty -all
reflect, in both explicit and implicit ways, 12 the pernicious effects of
sanism and pretextuality on the full range of mental disability law issues.
I believe it is impossible to truly understand the jurisprudence in any of
these areas without first understanding sanism and pretextuality."3
What do I mean by these terms? Simply put, "sanism" is an irrational
prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices
that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism,
sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.14 It infects both our juris-
prudence and our lawyering practices. 5 Sanism is largely invisible and
largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype,
myth, superstition, and deindividualization, and is sustained and
perpetuated by our use of alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and
heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in
7. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of Critique, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 263 (1999).
8. Ansar Haroun & Grant H. Morris, Weaving a Tangled Web: The Deceptions of
Psychiatrists, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 227 (1999).
9. Christopher Slobogin, Treating Kids Right: Deconstructing and
Reconstructing the Amenability to Treatment Concept, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
299 (1999).
10. Richard J. Bonnie & Svetlana V. Polubinskaya, Unraveling Soviet Psychiatry,
10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 279 (1999).
11. Charles M. Sevilla, Anti-Social Personality Disorder: Justification for the
Death Penalty?, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 247 (1999).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47.
13. See PERLIN, supra note 1, ch. 5.
14. The classic treatment is GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE
(1954). For an important new, and different, perspective, see ELISABETH YOUNG-
BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES (1996). See generally PERLIN, supra note 1, ch.
2 (discussing roots of sanism and the relationship between sanism and other "ismic"
behavior, such as racism, sexism, and homophobia); Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46
SMU L. REv. 373 (1992).
15. The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum. Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment. Some Comments on its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07
(Frank J. Ayd ed., 1974) [hereinafter Bimbaum, Comments]. See infra text
accompanying note 24; Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978); Michael L.
Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story of
Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 92-93 (1991) (discussing Birnbaum's insights).
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everyday life and in the legal process.
16
"Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and
frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses,
especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends."' 7 This pretextuality is
poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds
cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces
shoddy lawyering, blas6 judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or corrupt
testifying.
The title of my paper comes from Bob Dylan's anthemic masterpiece,
My Back Pages (best known by its chorus, "I was so much older
then/I'm younger than that now"). I use the key lyric--"half-wracked
prejudice leaped forth"-because I am convinced that sanism and
pretextuality reflect a specific kind of corrosive prejudice that is at the
roots of so much that is mental disability law.' 8 The line is from the
second verse of the song, which begins:
Half-wracked prejudice leaped forth
"Rip down all hate," I screamed
Lies that life is black and white
Spoke from my skull I dreamed ... .9
16. See, e.g., MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
(1994).
17. Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of
"Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991). See also Charles M. Sevilla, The
Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 840 (1974)
(discussing fabricated police testimony).
18. At a recent conference of the National Association of Rights, Protection and
Advocacy (NARPA), in response to a paper I presented critiquing the quality of counsel
in cases involving questions of mental disability law, Judi Chamberlin-a well-known
advocate for the rights of persons perceived to be mentally disabled, see ,e.g., JUDI
CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN (1978); Judi Chamberlin, The Ex-Patient's Movement, I J.
MIND & BEHAV. 324 (1990); Judi Chamberlin & Joseph A. Rogers, Planning A
Community-Based Mental Health System: Perspective of Service Recipients, 45 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1241 (1990)-questioned why there is even a special body of law called
"mental disability law," noting that there is no such topic as "dermatology law."
(Comment from audience, Nov. 20, 1998). I have given Ms. Chamberlin's question
much serious thought, and am convinced that both sanism and pretextuality need to be
understood if her question is to be legitimately answered.
19. BOB DYLAN, LYRICS, 1962-1985 (1985), at 139.
Typical of Dylan's lyrics, this verse is not without ambiguity. But it is
clear to me that its main themes-that prejudice leads to hatred; that the
world is not "black and white"; that our thoughts and our behaviors are
largely driven by unconscious forces-are the same themes that explain
sanist and pretextual behavior on the parts of courts, legislators, lawyers,
expert witnesses, and all other players in the mental disability law arena.
This article will proceed in the following manner. First, I will explain
the roots of my interest in these forces and explain how I came to apply
them to mental disability law. Next, I will define the key principles and
try to illuminate how they dominate this discourse. I will then examine
the other papers in this special issue and try to show how these
principles explain much of what would otherwise be incoherent in
mental disability law. Finally, I will offer some modest suggestions and
conclusions for future generations of mental disability law scholars to
ponder.
II. THE ROOTS
To a great extent, my interest in these phenomena began at two
separate points in time, both in the 1970s. As a "rookie" Public
Defender in Trenton, New Jersey, I often filed motions to suppress
evidence on behalf of my clients in criminal cases, arguing that the
police behavior in seizing contraband (usually small amounts of "street
drugs") violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on "unreasonable
searches and seizures." In almost all of these cases, the arresting
officer's testimony was basically the same: he would testify that, when
my client saw him coming, my client made a "furtive gesture," and then
reached into his pocket, took out a glassine envelope (filled with the
illegal drug), and threw it on the ground, blurting out, "That's heroin [or
whatever], and it's mine." My client-not surprisingly-told a different
story: that the policeman approached him, stuck his hands into my
client's pockets, pulled out the glassine envelope, and then placed my
client under arrest.
I had no doubt that my client was telling the truth. I suspected that the
judge and the prosecutor had the same intuition. Yet, in such cases-
they are called "dropsy" cases to all familiar with the "real life" of
criminal procedure-the judge invariably found the police officer to be
more credible and would thus rule that the search came within the "plain
view" exception of search and seizure law, upholding the search. It was
no surprise to me years later when I read Myron Orfield's article
(studying "dropsy" cases in Chicago), reporting that eighty-six percent
of judges, public defenders and prosecutors questioned (including
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seventy-seven percent of judges) believed that police officers fabricate
evidence in case reports at least "some of the time," and that a staggering
ninety-two percent (including ninety-one percent of judges) believe that
police officers lie in court to avoid suppression of evidence at least
"some of the time.",20 Although I did not know it at the time, this was
my first introduction to pretextuality in law.
21
My second introduction followed soon after, and involved questions
of mental disability law. Again, as the "rookie" Public Defender, I was
assigned to represent individuals at the Vroom Building, New Jersey's
maximum security facility for the "criminally insane," on their
applications for writs of habeas corpus. The cases were-to be
charitable-charades. The attorney-general asked the hospital doctor two
questions: was the patient mentally ill, and did he need treatment? The
answers always were "yes," and the writs were denied.22
20. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An
Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 100-07,
nn.113 & 146 (1992). Some judges, including former Chief Justice Burger, have
expressed doubt that police testimony in dropsy cases requires special scrutiny. See
Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[I]t would be a dismal
reflection on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in
court under oath, their testimony must be viewed with suspicion."). But see Judge
Irving Younger's opinion in People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1970), disagreeing with Justice Burger's point of view. McMurty is discussed in
Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibility Gap, 60
GEO. L. J. 507 (1971).
21. By this I mean simply that fact-finders accept (either implicitly or explicitly)
testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious)
decisionmaking, specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high
propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." Perlin,
supra note 17, at 133.
22. This changed radically (in New Jersey, at least) after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (applying
substantive and procedural due process protections to incompetency-to-stand-trial
process). See generally 3 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABILrrY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 14.15, at 248-50 (1989) [Editor's note: This three volume treatise was
published in 1989 and has been updated annually. The first volume of the second edition
was published in 1998, and the second volume of the second edition is scheduled to be
published in 1999. When this treatise is cited in this article, we will indicate date of
publication parenthetically to enable the reader to determine which volume is being
cited.]. See, e.g., Dixon v. Cahill, Docket No. L.30977-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1973) (consent order implementing Jackson), reprinted in 3 PERLIN, supra, § 14.17,
at 256-59. But see Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The
Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS
L. REv. 1 (1993) (more than half the states never implemented Jackson).
Some years later, after I became Director of New Jersey's Division of
Mental Health Advocacy, I read a story in the New York Times magazine
section that summarized for me many of the frustrations of my job. The
article dealt with an ex-patient, Gerald Kerrigan, who wandered the
streets of the Upper West Side of Manhattan. Kerrigan never threatened
or harmed anybody, but he was described as "different," "off," "not
right," somehow. It made other residents of that neighborhood-
traditionally home to one of the nation's most liberal voting blocs-
nervous to have him in the vicinity, and the story focused on the
response of a community block association to his presence. The story
hinted darkly that the social "experimentation" of deinstitutionalization
was somehow the villain. Soon after that, I read an excerpt from
Elizabeth Ashley's autobiography in New York magazine (a magazine
read by many of those same Upper West Siders). Ashley-a prominent
(and not unimportantly) strikingly attractive actress-told of her
institutionalization in one of New York City's most esteemed private
psychiatric hospitals and of her subsequent release from that hospital to
live with George Peppard, and to co-star with Robert Redford on
Broadway in Barefoot in the Park.
Ashley was praised for her courage. Kerrigan was emblematic of a
major "social problem." Both were persons who had been diagnosed
with mental illness. Both of their mental illnesses were serious enough
to require hospitalization. Both were subsequently released. Yet their
stories are presented-and read-in entirely different ways.
Gerald Kerrigan's story reflected the failures of "deinstitutionaliza-
tion" and demonstrated why the application of civil libertarian concepts
to the involuntary civil commitment process was a failure. Elizabeth
Ashley's story reflected the fortitude of a talented and gritty woman who
had the courage to "come out" and share her battle with mental illness.
No one discussed Gerald Kerrigan's autonomy values (or the quality of
life in the institution from which he was released). No one (in
discussing Ashley's case) characterized George Peppard's condo as a
"deinstitutionalization facility" or labeled starring in a Broadway smash
as participation in an "aftercare program."
Ashley was beautiful, talented and wealthy. And thus she was
different. Kerrigan was "different," but in a troubling way. But the
connection between Kerrigan and Ashley was never made.23
Again, at about the same time, I read a short article by Morton
23. I discuss Kerrigan and Ashley's cases in Michael L. Perlin, The
Deinstitutionalization Myths: Old Wine in New Bottles, in CONFERENCE REPORT: THE
SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 20
(Karl Menninger & Heather Watts eds. 1979).
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Birnbaum 4 in which he discussed what he called "sanism," how
"sanism" was like racism, sexism and other stereotyping "isms," and,
mostly, how "sanism"-part of our social "pathology of oppression""-
controlled mental disability law policy.
I remember, over twenty years ago, the moment when I read
Birnbaum's essay, and how, immediately, something simply "clicked."
At that point in time, I had already spent several years providing
individual and class action representation to institutionalized persons
with mental disabilities, and I had grown accustomed to asides, snickers,
and comments from judges, to "eyerolling" from my adversaries, to
running monologue commentaries by bailiffs and court clerks (all about
my clients' "oddness"). But I had never before consciously identified
what Birnbaum had been writing about: that this was all sanist behavior
on the part of the other participants in the mental disability law system.
From that moment on, I began to think about mental disability law in
different ways, I had already tried to come to grips with its pretexts (the
charade of the Vroom Building hearings in the era before Jackson v.
Indiana). But this explanation began to flesh out the picture in ways
that, finally, enabled me to make sense of what was going on around me.
I became a full-time professor in 1984, and for the last fifteen years
have taught a variety of mental disability law courses. I also speak about
a full range of mental disability law topics at conferences and workshops
on both a national and local basis. My audience is sometimes lawyers,
sometimes judges, sometimes psychiatrists and psychologists,
sometimes hospital staff, sometimes ex-patients and/or their families.
No matter: I cannot escape confronting the sanist and pretextual bases of
mental disability law.
Several years ago, I wrote a mental disability law treatise that I
continue to update yearly. As part of these updates, I have read virtually
every reported case involving mental disability law that has been
published in the past decade. Again, I cannot escape the sanist and
pretextual bases of mental disability law.
I write frequently for a variety of professional publications-for ones
24. Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 15. Dr. Birnbaum is universally regarded as
having first developed and articulated the constitutional basis of the right to treatment
doctrine for institutionalized mental patients. See Morton Bimbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 3A-2.1 at 8-
12 (2d ed. forthcoming 1999).
25. Birnbaum, Comments, supra note 15, at 107 (quoting civil rights leader
Florynce Kennedy).
read mostly by lawyers, for others read mostly by mental health
professionals, and for so-called "crossover" journals (read in equal
measure by both). And for the past several years, I have honed in my
focus on the sanist and pretextual bases of mental disability law. Sadly,
I now believe that sanism and pretextuality are the theoretical boundaries
of an overarching explanation of the intellectual and moral corruption of
mental disability law-theories that apply whether the subject is an
involuntary civil commitment case,26 a right to refuse treatment
27hearing, an interpretation of the Americans with Disabilities Act's ban
on discrimination against persons with mental disabilities,28 the
competence of a criminal defendant to waive counsel,29 or the aftermath
of a "successful" insanity defense.3" And again that theme, that theory,
is the reality of the sanist and pretextual bases of mental disability law, a
reality that is given depth, substance, and texture by the papers that are
being presented at this conference.
III. THE PRINCIPLES
"Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the
substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently
litigated. ,31
So wrote Justice Harry Blackmun a quarter of a century ago in
Jackson v. Indiana, the opinion that-for the first time at the U.S.
Supreme Court level-applied due process principles to a case involving
a litigant with a mental disability.32 Jackson, a case nominally about the
constitutional limitations on indefinite involuntary commitment
following a finding of incompetency to stand trial, was truly
revolutionary. It opened the courthouse doors to persons with mental
26. Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1993).
27. Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993).
28. Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and
Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAuL L. REv. 947 (1997).
29. Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin
Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
61(1996).
30. PERLIN, supra note 16.
31. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
32. Id. at 727-31. See generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2A-4.4, at 122-25 (2d
ed. 1998).
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disabilities. For the first time, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
"nature and duration" of a court-ordered commitment was
constitutionally bounded, and that issues involving personal freedom and
liberty of mentally disabled persons subject to institutionalization were
appropriate ones for court determination.33
The principles established in Jackson (and in Lessard v. Schmidt,34 a
contemporary federal district court case challenging the constitutionality
of a state commitment code) quickly "caught hold," and the next several
years saw an explosion of litigation questioning all aspects of the
processes by which persons with mental disabilities were committed to
psychiatric institutions, kept and treated in such institutions, and released
from institutional confinement. A cadre of public interest lawyers
listened to Justice Blackmun's observation in Jackson, and a dizzying
proliferation of cases followed, eventually leading to the articulation of a
constitutional right to treatment, the more-controversial right to refuse
treatment (mostly in cases dealing with the unwanted imposition of
psychotropic or antipsychotic medications), and a series of cases
sketching out the substantive and procedural constitutional limitations
on the involuntary civil commitment power.35
Trial judges hearing individual cases were not necessarily enthusiastic
about these developments. Decisions such as Jackson, Lessard, and
O'Connor v. Donaldson36 (setting out a constitutional right to liberty)
were never popular with trial judges or with court administrators for a
variety of instrumental, functional, normative, and philosophical
reasons. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, the highest courts in state
systems,37 and certain other federal courts,38 appeared to be taking
seriously-for the first time-"how they [institutionalized mental
33. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
34. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (subsequent citations omitted). See
generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, §§ 2A-4.4a, 2A-4.4c, at 126-32, 139-42 (2d ed.
1998).
35. See generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, chs. 2A, 2C-2D (2d ed. 1998);
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY, ch. 1 (1994).
36. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
37. E.g., State v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975) (application of procedural due
process to retention hearings following insanity acquittals); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d
337 (N.Y. 1986) (state constitutional right to refuse treatment).
38. E.g., Wyatt v Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (prior and subsequent
citations omitted) (constitutional right to treatment); Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d
Cir. 1983) (prior citations omitted) (constitutional right to refuse treatment).
patients] are treated as human beings."'39
At the same time that these cases were unfolding, the relationship
between mental disability and criminal law was undergoing a rapid
recalibration, but under very different circumstances, and in very
different ways. John Hinckley's attempted assassination of Ronald
Reagan dramatically ended years of quiet and thoughtful study of the
future of the insanity defense, and led to strident political posturing,
eventually resulting in the passage of the Insanity Defense Reform Act.
n°
That legislation returned the federal courts to a more restrictive version
of the English M'Naghten standard (the so-called "right from wrong"
test), a formulation that had been seen as outmoded from the time of its
first articulation in 1843.41 Hinckley also placed the entire question of
how mentally disabled defendants are dealt with in the criminal trial
process under the legislative and judicial microscope.42 Like the moth to
the flame, the U.S. Supreme Court became fascinated-perhaps
preoccupied-with the full range of questions involving this population,
deciding, in the past fifteen years, a stream of cases dealing with such
questions as competency to stand trial, competency to waive counsel
and/or plead guilty, the relationship between mental disability and the
death penalty, the impact of mental disability on confessions law, the
application of the right to refuse treatment in the prison and pretrial
setting, and the constitutional boundaries of the commitment and
retention procedures that follow a successful insanity defense. And this
stream shows no sign of abating.
43
Finally, Congress was no longer dormant. After adopting a flurry of
mostly-hortatory laws,' it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act,45
legislation characterized-perhaps a tad overambitiously-as "the
39. Falter v. Veterans Administration, 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980).
40. See generally PERLIN, supra note 16.
41. PERLIN, supra note 22, § 15.04, at 286-94.
42. Id. §§ 15.35-15.40, at 389-404.
43. See generally Michael L. Perlin, "No Direction Home:" The Law and
Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 20 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL DISABI.ITY L.
REP. 605 (1996).
44. See, e.g., Mental Health Systems Act (MHSA), 42 U.S.C. § 9501 (1994);
Developmentally Disabled Bill of Rights Act (DD Bill of Rights Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6000
(1994 & Supp. 1996); Protection and Advocacy for the Mentally Ill Act (PAMI), 42
U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851. Case law construing the substantive portions of both the
MHSA and the PAMI has been paltry. See, e.g., PERLIN, supra note 24, § 6.44, at 136
(1998 Cum. Supp). The Supreme Court has held that sections of the DD Bill of Rights
Act do not create substantive, privately enforceable rights. See Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 8 (1981). I discuss the dilemma raised by hortatory
language in disability rights statutes in Perlin, supra note 28.
45. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
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'Emancipation Proclamation for those with disabilities."' The ADA,
which, on its face, bars disability-based discrimination in virtually every
aspect of private and public life,47 appears to offer great promise to
persons with mental disabilities. However, the case law has been
spotty,48 and it is not at all clear that this promise will be fulfilled.49 The
Supreme Court's recent decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,5° finding that
"unjustified [institutional] isolation... is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability," 51 and that patients had a qualified
right to community-based treatment, 52 "implicitly acknowledges the
corrosive impact of sanist behavior."' 3 It is still, however, far too soon
to comfortably speculate about the case's ultimate impact on the
developments I have been discussing here, especially given the
majority's willingness to defer to the judgments and assessments of
institutional professionals.54
It is impossible, however, to understand mental disability law simply
by reading the Supreme Court's cases, studying the courts' holdings and
analyzing the doctrine, or by taking federal legislation at face value. For
these cases-and other "great" cases that are subject to intense scrutiny
and academic deconstruction and practitioner commentary55 and
46. Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, Insuring Americans with Disabilities: How
Far Can Congress Go To Protect Traditional Practices? 40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 n.2
(1991) (quoting statement by bill's sponsors).
47. The accompanying Congressional report is clear: the purpose of the ADA is to
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against
individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabilities into the economic and
social mainstream of American life." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMERICANS
wiTH DISABILrTIEs ACT OF 1990, H.R. REP. No. 485 (Il), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., at 23
(1990).
48. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 6.44A, at 176-90 (1998 Cum. Supp.),
and id. at nn.473.43-473.43z23 (citing cases).
49. Perlin, supra note 28, at 955-57, 984-85.
50. 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
51. Id. at 2185.
52. Id. at 2185-88.
53. PERLIN, supra note 1, ch. 8.
54. Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2188. See generally Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 323 (1982). (establishing "substantial professional judgment" test in analyzing
institutional liability in patients' rights cases).
55. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (prior and
subsequent citations omitted) (constitutional right to treatment). For a sampling of the
literature on Wyatt, see, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 3A-3.2c, at 54-56 (2d ed.
forthcoming 1999).
hortatory federal statutes 56-tell us virtually nothing about the related
questions that are, in many ways, of far greater importance: how is
mental disability law applied in "unknown" cases, and why is it applied
that way?
In the more than a quarter of a century that I have worked, taught,
thought and written about this area, two overarching issues dominate and
overwhelm the subject matter: mental disability law is sanist,57 and
mental disability law is pretextual5 8 I am further convinced, beyond any
doubt, that it is impossible to truly understand anything about mental
disability law-the doctrine, the debate, the discourse, the decisions, the
dissents-without first coming to grips with this reality. And I am
equally convinced that the apparent contradictions, internal
inconsistencies, and cognitive dissonances of mental disability law
cannot be understood without understanding the power and
pervasiveness of these concepts.
First, consider sanism and the judicial process. Judges are not
immune from sanism. "[E]mbedded in the cultural presuppositions that
engulf us all,"59 judges express discomfort with social science60 (or any
other system that may appear to challenge law's hegemony over society)
and skepticism about new thinking; this discomfort and skepticism
allows them to take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, non-
reflective "ordinary common sense," both of which continue the myths
and stereotypes of sanism.
61
56. Perlin, supra note 28, at 958-60.
57. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 14; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman,
Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence,
11 BEHAV. SC. & L. 47 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death
Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of "Mitigating" Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 239 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanist Lives]; Michael
L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be
Undone? 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993-94).
58. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 17; Perlin, supra note 26; Michael L. Perlin,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental
Disability Law, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994).
59. Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 329, 332 (1991).
60. The discomfort that judges often feel in having to decide mental disability law
cases is often palpable. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide
Competency Questions? Stripping the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U.
KAN. L. REv. 957, 991 (1990) (Court's characterization in Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310
(4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990), of judicial involvement in
right to refuse antipsychotic medication cases as "'already perilous' . . . reflects the
court's almost palpable discomfort in having to confront the questions before it.").
61. Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REv. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin,
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Judges reflect and project the conventional morality of the
community, and judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal
mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist
stereotypes.62 Their language demonstrates bias against mentally
disabled individuals 63 and contempt for the mental health professions.
64
Courts often appear impatient with mentally disabled litigants, ascribing
their problems in the legal process to weak character or poor resolve.
Thus, a popular sanist myth is that "[m]entally disabled individuals
simply don't try hard enough. They give in too easily to their basest
instincts, and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint. "65 We assume
that "[m]entally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to
participate in 'normal' activities [and] to make autonomous decisions
about their lives (especially in the area of medical care) .... "
Sanist thinking allows judges to avoid difficult choices in mental
Psychodynamics]; Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology
of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 618-30 (1989-90)
[hereinafter Perlin, Myths].
62. See Perlin, supra note 14, at 400-04.
63. See Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 569 (11th Cir. 1983), reh'g. denied, 714 F.2d
159 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984) (defendant referred to as a
"lunatic"); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th Cir., 1987) (quoting
Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974) (using "lunatic")); Brown v.
People, 134 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ill. 1956) (judge asked defendant, "You are not crazy at
this time, are you?"); Pyle v. Boles, 250 F. Supp. 285, 289 n.3 (N.D. W. Va. 1966) (trial
judge accused habeas petitioner of "being crazy"). But cf State v. Penner, 772 P.2d 819
(Kan. 1989) (unpublished disposition), at *3 (witnesses admonished not to refer to
defendant as "crazy" or "nuts").
64. See Commonwealth v. Musolino, 467 A.2d 605, 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)
(reversible error for trial judge to refer to expert witnesses as "headshrinkers").
Compare State v. Percy, 507 A.2d 955, 957 n.1 (Vt. 1986), appeal after remand, 595
A.2d 248 (Vt. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 927 (1991) (reversing a conviction where
prosecutor, in closing argument, referred to expert testimony as "psycho-babble"), with
Commonwealth v. Cosme, 575 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Mass. 1991) (not error where
prosecutor referred to defendant's expert witnesses as "a little head specialist" and a
"wizard"). See generally Douglas Mossman & Marshall Kapp, "Courtroom Whores" ?-
or Why Do Attorneys Call Us? Findings from a Survey on Attorneys' Use of Mental
Health Experts, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 27 (1998).
65. Perlin, supra note 14, at 396; see, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Rhetoric of
Responsibility, 76 VA. L. REv. 197, 238 (1990) (Hinckley prosecutor suggested to jurors,
"if Hinckley had emotional problems, they were largely his own fault"); see also State v.
Duckworth, 496 So. 2d 624, 635 (La. App. 1986) (juror who felt defendant would be
responsible for actions as long as he "wanted to do them" not excused for cause) (no
error).
66. Perlin, supra note 14, at 394.
disability law cases; their reliance on non-reflective, self-referential,
alleged "ordinary common sense," contributes further to the
pretextuality that underlies much of this area of the law. Such reliance is
likely to make it even less probable that judicial decisions67 in right to
refuse treatment cases reflect the sort of "dignity" values essential for a
fair hearing.68 Some judges simply "rubber stamp" hospital treatment
recommendations in right to refuse cases.69 Other judges are often
punitive in cases involving mentally disabled litigants,7" and their
decisions frequently reflect "textbook" sanist attitudes.7"
At its base, sanism is irrational. Any investigation of the roots or
sources of mental disability jurisprudence must factor in society's
67. Where the fact-finder is a nonjudicial officer, the problems discussed here are
probably accentuated further. See Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal
Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in
Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REv. 329, 331-32 (1992) (psychiatrists-as-fact-
finders more likely to take paternalistic positions in right to refuse cases).
68. See generally Perlin, supra note 29. Courts and commentators have regularly
discussed "dignity" in a fair trial context both in cases involving mentally disabled
criminal defendants and in other settings. See, e.g., Marquez v. Collins, 11 F.3d 1241,
1244 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Solemnity... and respect for individuals are components of a fair
trial"); Heffeman v. Norris, 48 F.3d 331, 336 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("the
forced ingestion of mind-altering drugs not only jeopardizes an accused's rights to a fair
trial, it also tears away another layer of individual dignity ..."); Keith D. Nicholson,
Would You Like Some More Salt in That Wound? Post-Sentence Victim Allocution in
Texas, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1103, 1128 (1995) (for trial to be fair, "it must be conducted
in an atmosphere of respect, order, decorum and dignity befitting its importance both to
the prosecution and the defense" (quoting In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166, 1174
(S.D.N.Y. 1973))); see also Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial
Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 444-45
(1992) (significance of dignity values in involuntary civil commitment hearings);
Deborah A. Dorfman, Effectively Implementing Title I of the Americans With Disabilities
Act for Mentally Disabled Persons: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 8 J.L. &
HEALTH 105, 116 (1993-94) (same).
69. See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Difference
Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REv. 15, 59 (1991), and id. at n.148 (citing
studies).
70. Cf. Perlin, supra note 14, at 401 n.203:
None is perhaps as chilling as the following story: Sometime after the trial
court's decision in Rennie ... , I had occasion to speak to a state court trial judge
about the Rennie case. He asked me, "Michael, do you know what I would have
done had you brought Rennie before me?" (The Rennie case was litigated by
counsel in the N.J. Division of Mental Health Advocacy; I was director of the
Division at that time). I replied, "No," and he then answered, "I'd've taken the
son-of- a-bitch behind the courthouse and had him shot." Id. (citation omitted).
71. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 27, at 174 (discussing the sanist nature of Justice
Thomas's dissent in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992)); Perlin & Dorfman, supra
note 57, at 58-61 (same).
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irrational mechanisms that govern our dealings with mentally disabled
individuals.72 The entire legal system makes assumptions about persons
with mental disabilities-who they are, how they got that way, what
makes them different, what there is about them that lets us treat them
differently, and whether their conditions are immutable.73  These
assumptions reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental disability,
persons with mental disability, and the possibility that we may become
mentally disabled. 74 The most important question of all-why do we
feel the way we do about these people?-is rarely asked.
75
These conflicts compel an inquiry about the extent to which social
science data does (or should) inform the development of mental
disability law jurisprudence. After all, if we agree that mentally disabled
individuals can be treated differently (because of their mental disability,
or because of behavioral characteristics that flow from that disability),76
it would appear logical that this difference in legal treatment is-or
should be-founded on some sort of empirical data base that confirms
both the existence and the causal role of such difference. Yet, we tend
to ignore, subordinate, or trivialize behavioral research in this area,
especially when acknowledging that such research would be cognitively
dissonant with our intuitive (albeit empirically flawed) views.77  The
72. See generally Perlin, Myths, supra note 61.
73. See generally MARTHA MINOw, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION,
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); SANDER GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND
PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, AND MADNESS (1985).
74. See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense "-Why
Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853, 868-69 (1963); Perlin, supra note 15, at 108 (on society's fears
of mentally disabled persons), and id. at 93 n. 174 ("[W]hile race and sex are immutable,
we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the level of
virulence we experience here."). On the way that public fears about the purported link
between mental illness and dangerousness "drive the formal laws and policies"
governing mental disability jurisprudence, see John Monahan, Mental Disorder and
Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 511 (1992).
75. See PERLIN, supra note 16, at 6-7 (asking this question). Cf Carmel Rogers,
Proceedings Under the Mental Health Act 1992: The Legalisation of Psychiatry, 1994
N.Z. L.J. 404, 408 ("Because the preserve of psychiatry is populated by 'the mad' and
'the loonies,' we do not really want to look at it too closely-it is too frightening and
maybe contaminating.").
76. On the Supreme Court's confusion over the meaning of "mental disorder," see
1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2A-3.3, at 75-92 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act));
Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/and Failure's No Success at All":
Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998).
77. See generally J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurisprudence:
steady stream of new, comprehensive research does not promise any
change in society's attitudes. 8
Now, what about pretextuality? The pretexts of the forensic mental
health system are reflected both in the testimony of forensic experts and
in the decisions of legislators and fact-finders.79 Experts frequently
testify in accordance with their own self-referential concepts of
"morality"8 and openly subvert statutory and caselaw criteria that
impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment 8' or
that articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency
to stand trial finding.82 Often this testimony is further warped by a
heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of us-succumb to the
seductive allure of simplifying cognitive devices in their thinking, and
employ such heuristic gambits as the vividness effect or attribution
theory in their testimony.83
This testimony is then weighed and evaluated by frequently-sanist
fact-finders. 8 Judges and jurors, both consciously and unconsciously,
often rely on reductionist, prejudice-driven stereotypes in their
decisionmaking, thus subordinating statutory and caselaw standards as
well as the legitimate interests of the mentally disabled persons who are
the subject of the litigation. Judges' predispositions to employ the same
sorts of heuristics as do expert witnesses further contaminate the
process.85
The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137 (1990).
78. For the most comprehensive research on predictions of violence, for example,
see John Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical and Actuarial
Predictions of Violence, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY, §§ 7-2.0-7-2.4, at 300 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
79. See, e.g., Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D.D.C. 1987) (Although
District of Columbia Code contained provision that patient could invoke to seek periodic
review of commitment or independent psychiatric evaluation, in 22 years since passage
of relevant statute, not a single patient exercised rights to statutory review.). The
significance of Streicher is discussed in Arlene S. Kanter, Abandoned but Not Forgotten:
The Illegal Confinement of Elderly People in State Psychiatric Institutions, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 273, 304-06 (1991-92).
80. See, e.g., Cassia Spohn & Julia Homey, "The Law's the Law, But Fair Is
Fair": Rape Shield Laws and Officials' Assessments of Sexual History Evidence, 29
CRIMINOL. 137, 139 (1991) "([A legal] reform that contradicts deeply held beliefs may
result either in open defiance of the law or in a surreptitious attempt to modify the law.)."
81. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 17, at 135-36.
82. See, e.g., People v. Doan, 366 N.W.2d 593, 598 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985), appeal
denied, (1985) (expert testified that defendant was "out in left field" and went
"bananas").
83. See generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 61.
84. See generally Perlin, supra note 14; Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 57.
85. See generally Perlin, supra note 26; Perlin, supra note 60.
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I believe that these two concepts have controlled-and continue to
control-modem mental disability law. Just as importantly (perhaps,
more importantly), they continue to exert this control invisibly. This
invisibility means that the most important aspects of mental disability
law-not just the law "on the books," but, more importantly, the law in
action and practice-remains hidden from the public discussions about
mental disability law.
We must also ponder another reality: the fact that, in many ways,
mental disability law is a giant trompe d'oeil illusion. From one
perspective it is a topic of great interest to the Supreme Court and other
appellate courts, and its "cutting-edge" issues sound very much like the
"cutting-edge" issues of other areas of constitutional law: allocations of
burdens of proof,86 scope of the liberty clause," and categorizations for
"heightened scrutiny" purposes,88 to name a few.
From another perspective, however, it is a topic dealt with on a daily
basis by trial courts across the country in a series of unknown cases
involving unknown litigants, where justice is often administered in
assembly-line fashion. Sophisticated legal arguments are rarely made,
expert witnesses are infrequently called to testify, and lawyers all too
often provide barely-perfunctory representation. 89 From this perspec-
tive, mental disability law is often invisible, both to the general public
and to the academy.
And there is more. Although Supreme Court doctrine and "high
theory" give us needed building blocks, they do not-cannot-tell us
what really happens in involuntary civil commitment cases, in
86. See, e.g., Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (imposing burden of proof
by preponderance of evidence on defendant claiming incompetence to stand trial not
violative of due process clause); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (imposing
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence on defendant claiming incompetence
to stand trial violative of due process clause).
87. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (right of prisoners to
refuse antipsychotic medication).
88. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (mental retardation neither suspect class nor quasi-suspect class for equal
protection purposes); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (no equal protection violation
where state statute allows commitment of persons with mental retardation on a lesser
standard of proof than persons with mental illness).
89. See, e.g., JAMES A. HOLSTEIN, COURT-ORDERED INSANITY: INTERPRETIVE
PRACTICE AND INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT (1993); James A. Holstein, Court Ordered
Incompetence: Conversational Organization in Involuntary Commitment Hearings, 35
Soc. PROBS. 459 (1988).
competency to stand trial determinations, in recommitment hearings for
insanity acquittees, or in individual challenges to the imposition of
unwanted antipsychotic medication. For us to truly understand what
mental disability law is all about, it is vital that we think about these
questions.
There is a wide gap between law-on-the-books and law-in-action.
There is probably such a gap in every area of the law. But here, the
omnipresence of sanism and pretextuality make the gap even more
problematic.
Mental disability law suffers from both over-attention and under-
attention. A handful of sensational criminal cases-Hinckley, Colin
Ferguson, John DuPont, the Unabomber-are, by nature of the facts of
the underlying crime or identity of the victim, subject to intense analysis
and scrutiny. The mental disability law issues raised in these cases-the
insanity defense, competence to stand trial, competence to waive
counsel-are reported on as if they typify (1) other cases involving the
same issue, and (2) cases involving other aspects of mental disability
law.90 Civil cases are rarely the focus of so much interest, but court
decisions in a handful of cases involving potential professional
liability-Tarasoff v. Board of Regents9' is, by far, the most famous-
are disseminated widely to professional audiences, and their holdings
(and significance for practitioners) are regularly over-exaggerated and
distorted.92
On the other hand, the overwhelming number of cases involving
mental disability law issues are "litigated" (I use quotation marks here
intentionally and provocatively) in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil
commitment cases are routinely disposed of in a matter of minutes in
closed courtrooms.93 Right to refuse treatment hearings often honor the
90. See generally PERLIN, supra note 16; Michael L. Perlin, Myths, Realities, and
the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Political World]; Michael L.
Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L.
REv. 1375 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, The Borderline].
91. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
92. For example, more than three-quarters of the clinicians surveyed reported that
the issuance of warnings was the sole acceptable means of protecting potential victims
and avoiding Tarasoff liability. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality:
An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443, 465 (1984)
(discussed in Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:
New Directions for the 1990's, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 29, 54 (1992)).
93. See, e.g., HoLsTEIN, supra note 89; Holstein, supra note 89. The Supreme
Court previously noted that the average time for involuntary civil commitment hearings
was 9.2 minutes. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979).
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letter and spirit of decisions such as Rivers v. Katz94 with little more than
lip service.95 Nearly ninety percent of all insanity defense cases are
"walkthroughs" (i.e., stipulated on the papers). 6 The complex textures
of mental disability law are rarely raised in the garden variety tort case
brought by a mentally disabled plaintiff.97
Often, constitutional doctrines articulated by the Supreme Court in
mental disability law cases are ignored. The Supreme Court has held-
on more than one occasion-that the right to refuse treatment is
protected, at least in part, by the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9" Yet, in case after case, a patient's apparent desire to
enforce or vindicate this constitutional right is relied upon as evidence
that supports the patient's involuntary civil commitment.99 The Supreme
Court has held-on several occasions-that the possibility of side
effects (especially irreversible neurological side effects such as tardive
dyskinesia) is a factor to be considered in determining whether the
Fourteenth Amendment has been violated in an individual case.100 Yet,
an examination of the universe of reported individual right to refuse
treatment cases shows that side effects are rarely, if ever, mentioned." 1
The Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that "many psychiatric
94. 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (state constitutional right to refuse treatment).
95. See, e.g., cases discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 24, § 3B-7.2e, at 290-92 (2d
ed. forthcoming 1999).
96. On the average, there is examiner agreement in 88% of all insanity cases.
Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insanity Defense: Contested or Conceded? 141 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 885, 885 (1984); Kenneth K. Fukunaga et al., Insanity Plea: Interexaminer
Agreement in Concordance of Psychiatric Opinion and Court Verdict, 5 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 325, 326 (1981). See Perlin, Political World, supra note 90, at 12.
97. For exceptions, see, for example, Moore v. Wyoming Med. Ctr., 825 F. Supp.
1531 (D. Wyo. 1993) (improper involuntary civil commitment case); Fair Oaks Hosp. v.
Pocrass, 628 A.2d 829 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (same).
98. See, e.g., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Washington v. Harper,
494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990).
99. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than
"Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence,
and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 114, 133-34 (1996), and sources cited id. at n.181; Michael L. Perlin,
Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting Judicial Behavior in Civil and
Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37, 52-59
(1991).
100. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133-35 (1992); Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30.
101. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 3B-7.2c, at 278-86, § 3B-7.2e, at 290-92
(2d ed. forthcoming 1999).
predictions of dangerousness are inaccurate." 10 2 Yet, such predictions
are offered-frequently in minimalist ways that are subject to no
meaningful cross-examination or challenge--daily in civil commitment
courts across the country.0 3
State legislatures craft elaborate commitment codes, often mandating
the need for an "overt act" as a predicate to commitment. 1°4 Yet, the
expression of wishes, desires or the recitation of fantasies has been relied
upon as a basis for commitment in individual cases.0 5 The right to
counsel is provided for in virtually every state commitment statute.106
That right is often honored only in the breach; lawyers representing
patients-and, just as importantly, those representing mentally disabled
criminal defendants--often reflect Judge Bazelon's worst nightmare of
"walking violations of the Sixth Amendment."10 7
State legislatures pass broad-based "Patients' Bills of Rights,"
purporting to provide inpatients with the same bundle of civil and
constitutional rights mandated in a series of federal class action/law
reform cases litigated in the early 1970s.0 °8 Yet, there has been virtually
102. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323 (1993) (emphasis added). Remarkably, this
language has remained virtually unnoticed to this day, the only reference in the literature
being a law review article written by Jodlle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters
Should See To It That in the Process She Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting The
Sexual Predator With Silver Bullets-Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415--and a Stake
Through the Heart-Kansas v. Hendricks, 49 FLA. L. REV. 505 (1997):
The inability of psychiatric professionals to predict violence has been specifically
recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323
(1993) (There are "difficulties inherent in diagnosis of mental illness.... It is thus
no surprise that many psychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the
mentally ill are inaccurate.").
Id. at 549-50 n.252.
103. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2C-5.2, at 414-15 (2d ed. 1998).
104. See id., § 2A-4.5, at 152-57 (citing cases).
105. See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 775 n.12 (Colo. 1988) (relying on
presumed sexually inappropriate dress and manner-posing "provocatively in front of a
mirror in the [hospital] day room in a tight-fitting leotard"-as sufficient evidence of a
patient's danger to self to support his order of commitment); State v. Hass, 566 A.2d
1181, 1185 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (holding that a patient's sexual fantasies can
serve as confirmatory evidence supporting his need for treatment under the state Sexual
Offenders Act).
106. See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 74 (1996); see generally I PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2B-3.1,
at 197-201 (2d ed. 1998) (citing cases).
107. David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1,
2 (1973). For recent cases in the death penalty context, see Michael L. Perlin, "The
Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in
Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 204-07 (1996).
108. See generally Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil
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no follow-up litigation seeking to give life to, implement, or construe
these laws."° Moreover, trial courts regularly refuse to consider right to
treatment issues in the context of individual commitment cases."
Congress has passed the Americans with Disabilities Act, and, in doing
so, buttressed the substantive anti-discrimination provisions of the Act
with findings that appear to provide-at the least-Equal Protection
safeguards for covered individuals."' Yet, there has been literally only a
handful of cases brought by institutionalized (or formerly-
institutionalized) mentally disabled persons to effectuate these
provisions, and even fewer that have granted relief."2 Again, Olmstead
v. L. C. may augur a bold new direction, but it is far too soon to
determine whether its "potential promise will be fulfilled." 113
Supreme Court cases are also routinely ignored, sometimes for
decades. In 1990, in Zinermon v. Burch, the Court ruled that there must
be some sort of a due process hearing (albeit a modest one) before a
patient's voluntary application for hospitalization could be accepted.'14
Yet, only a few states have amended their court rules or voluntary
admission statutes to comply with Zinermon's mandate and, again, there
has been virtually no follow-up litigation. 115 Even more astonishingly,
in 1972-a full quarter-century ago-the Court ruled in Jackson v.
Indiana'16 that an incompetent-to-strand-trial criminal defendant could
not be housed indefinitely in a maximum security forensic facility
because of that status unless it appeared likely that he or she would
regain competence to stand trial within the "foreseeable future."'1 17 Yet,
twenty-five years later, nearly half the states had still not implemented
Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to
Redemption? 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80 (1995); 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 11.03,
at 953-58 (1989) (citing statutes).
109. Note the paucity of subsequent developments in 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, §
11.03 at 283 (1998 Cum. Supp.).
110. See 1 Perlin, supra note 22, 2C-8.1, at 507-09 (2d ed. 1998) (citing cases).
111. Perlin, supra note 28, at 948-49. Cf. Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-54.
112. See generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 6.44A, at 176-90 (1998 Cum. Supp.),
and id. at nn. 473.43-473.43z23 (citing cases).
113. PERLIN, supra note 1, ch. 8 (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 54, on file with
author).
114. 494 U.S. 113 (1990).
115. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2C-7.2a, at 490 n.1373 (2d ed. 1998) (citing
cases).
116. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
117. Id. at 738.
Jackson."8 It is probably not coincidental that the only four academics
who have ever written about this scandal are among the contributors to
the symposium that served as the precursor to this journal issue." 9
Criminal court prosecutors compound the problems. "Find this man
not guilty by reason of insanity," they warn jurors, "and he will walk
away a free man after a few weeks of 'country club' treatment."' 12 The
reality, of course, is far different. Insanity acquittees spend almost
double the amount of time in maximum security forensic settings that
defendants convicted of like charges serve in prison.' 21 In one study,
California defendants found NGRI in cases involving nonviolent
offenses were confined for periods nine times as long as individuals
found guilty of similar offenses. 122  The Supreme Court decision in
Shannon v. United States-holding that, as a matter of federal criminal
procedure, the defendant had no right to have the jury informed about
the possible consequences of an NGRI verdict123-will only increase the
amount of pretextuality in decisionmaking in this area of the law. 24
And insanity defense matters are but a small fraction of criminal cases in
which sanism and pretextuality flourish.' 25
This area of the law is further infected by an excess of finger-pointing
and blame-attributing. Some clinicians and hospital administrators are
quick to point their fingers at "the law" to explain many of the failures of
118. See Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUm. BEHAV. 39, 48 (1992) (citing inter
alia, Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REv. 921,
940 (1985)).
119. See Meloy & Morris, supra note 22; Perlin, supra note 118; Winick, supra
note 118.
120. See, e.g., Perlin, The Borderline, supra note 90, at 1406 (discussing, inter alia,
People v. Aliwoli, 606 N.E.2d 347, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)).
121. PERLIN, supra note 16, at 110 (citing, inter alia, Joseph H. Rodriguez, et al.,
The Insanity Defense Under Siege: Legislative Assaults and Legal Rejoinders, 14
RUTGERS L.J. 397, 403-04 (1983)).
122. PERLIN, supra note 16, at 110-11 (citing HENRY STEADMAN ET AL., REFORMING
THE INSANITY DEFENSE: AN ANALYSIS OF PRE-AND POST-HINCKLEY REFORMS 58-61
(1993)).
123. 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
124. For recent cases, see 3 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 15.16A, at 510-11 n.372.42
(1998 Cum. Supp.).
125. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal
Law: Mental Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431,
451 (1995) ("in each [reported Federal Sentencing Guidelines case in which mental
disability was an issue], without exception, the U.S. Attorney's Office opposed the use
of mental disability as a mitigating factor"). On the ways that jurors process social
science evidence (and mitigating mental disability evidence) in death penalty cases, see
Perlin, supra note 107, at 216-21; Perlin, Sanist Lives, supra note 57, at 260-65.
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institutional mental health care. Staff at major inpatient psychiatric
hospitals tell the press that their "hands are tied," and that they are
unduly frustrated by laws that are overly-protective of patients' civil
liberties but that ignore (or are counter-productive to) patients' clinical
and medical needs. These allegations have become the "script" of much
contemporary mental disability law policy. Yet, in addition to being
inflammatory and confrontative, they are also largely baseless. A while
ago, I received a phone call from the editorial desk of a major
metropolitan newspaper, asking about a local cause celebre-an
apparently randomly violent, former mental patient who was allegedly
victimizing a block of a New York City neighborhood well known for
its traditional adherence to liberal social causes.126 My caller told me
that, in answer to his question as to why this individual was not
committable in a state psychiatric hospital, he had been told by hospital
staff that such commitment required proof of a "recent overt act."
I told him that that was the standard in several jurisdictions, but it was
emphatically not a prerequisite for commitment in his state (and, in fact,
that test had been specifically rejected by the state's appellate courtS).
127
Indeed, the New York courts had made it eminently clear that a recent
overt act is not required, and a challenge to that standard had failed in
the federal appellate courts over a decade earlier. 128 My caller was quite
reasonably perplexed as to why he had been given this misinforma-
tion.
12 9
So what explanation is there for all of this? There is, in short, often a
huge gap between what mental disability law appears to be, and what it
actually is. This gap is widened further by the reality that we-lawyers,
professors, psychologists, psychiatrists, expert witnesses, clinicians,
126. See Seltzer v. Hogue, 594 N.Y.S.2d 781 (App. Div. 1993).
127. See, e.g., In re Scopes, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 1977).
128. [W]e are of the opinion that such a requirement [of an overt act] is too re-
strictive and not necessitated by substantive due process. The lack of any
evidence of a recent overt act, attempt or threat, especially in cases where the
individual has been kept continuously on certain medications, does not necessarily
diminish the likelihood that the individual poses a threat of substantial harm to
himself or others.
Id. at 913. See also, Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983).
129. I discuss the implications of this interchange extensively in Michael L. Perlin,
Back to the Past: Why Mental Disability Law "Refonns" Don't Reform, 4 CaM. L.F.
403, 403-05 (1993) (book review of JOHN Q. LA FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO
THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
(1992)).
jurors, the press, the public-know very little about what really happens
in most mental disability law cases.
I have begun to write regularly-relentlessly, I might even say-about
sanism and pretextuality, so as to seek to expose their pernicious power,
the ways in which two factors infect judicial decisions, legislative
enactments, administrative directives, jury behavior, and public
attitudes, the ways that these factors undercut any efforts at creating a
unified body of mental disability law jurisprudence, and the ways that
these factors contaminate scholarly discourse and lawyering practices
alike.13° And I have written to argue that, unless and until we come to
grips with these concepts-and their stranglehold on mental disability
law development-any efforts at truly understanding this area of the
law, or at understanding the relationship between law and psychology,
are doomed to failure.
IV. THE SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES
The other articles in this symposium issue all sound variations on the
same theme- again, some explicitly, some implicitly. Professor
Morris's thoughtful article on defining dangerousness asks specifically,
"[W]hy ... is mental disorder the singular focus of our preventive
detention decision making?",131 and then (graciously) answers, "It is
difficult to deny Michael Perlin's pronouncement that our irrational fear
of the mentally disordered-our sanist attitude-incites us to
dehumanize them, to use dangerousness as a pretext to exorcise 'them'
from 'our' midst." '32 Professor Winick carefully applies the therapeutic
jurisprudence lens to the involuntary civil commitment hearing, and
underscores that the "paternalistic role" of lawyers at such hearings
represents sanism and pretextuality, "a deeply ingrained prejudice
against those with mental illness, reinforced by stereotypes, and a basic
dishonesty in the civil commitment process, shared by judges, lawyers,
and clinicians," turning the adversary process into a "farce and a
mockery." '13 3 Professor Stefan shows us how the Americans with
Disabilities Act responded specifically to centuries of sanism-"the
segregation and stigmatization of people with [mental] disabilities"'34-
but also points out how state mental health systems continue to be
founded on pretexts (about the availability of treatment to persons
130. See generally PERLIN supra note 1.
131. Morris, supra note 4, at 97.
132. Id. at 98.
133. Winick, supra note 3, at 41.
134. Stefan, supra note 6, at 136.
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institutionalized because of mental illness), and how these pretexts and
the concomitant "[tiotal separation and segregation" of persons with
mental disabilities lead to an environment in which additional sanism
festers. 135
Professors Behnke and Saks carefully read the impressive body of
literature produced by the MacArthur Network on Law and Mental
Health and stress a finding that most of the public would find
astonishing: that, in determining capacity to consent to treatment, half of
all schizophrenic patients scored in the "non-impaired" range, 136 a figure
that flies squarely in the face of the sanist "take" on the capacity (or, I
should say, incapacity) of persons with mental disabilities to make
important decisions, and which exposes the pretextuality of much of our
law and practice in this area. Professor Wexler applies the therapeutic
jurisprudence lens as a tool for exposing, among other pretexts, the
"sham" that exists in many involuntary civil commitment systems, 13 7
and offers the "right brain" suggestion that our "culture of critique" '138 is
at least partially to blame for the current dismal state of affairs. And
finally, Professor Morse reminds us that sanist stereotyping-about the
way "all" persons with mental disabilities act, about the way diagnosis
frequently preordains case disposition, about the destructive impact of
labeling 139-leads to bad law (as well as, presumably, bad mental
health).
Dr. Haroun's and Professor Morris's article is a blueprint for
understanding the pretextual basis of much expert testimony. Their
indictment of the seductive witness, the avenging witness and others-
deceptive witnesses all 14 0-forces us to rethink the allegedly-empirical
bases of much important courtroom testimony in the full range of
criminal cases before the courts. Charles Sevilla sets out the ways that
the improper use of mental disorders as aggravating factors at the
punishment phase of a death penalty case are both sanist and
135. Id. at 145.
136. Saks & Behnke, supra note 5, at 111.
137. Wexler, supra note 7, at 274-75 (quoting David B. Wexler, Justice, Mental
Health, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 718-19 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds.
1996)).
138. Id. at 264-67
139. Morse, supra note 2, at 203.
140. Haroun & Morris, supra note 8, 242-44.
pretextual,141 looking specifically at the testimony of the infamous Dr.
Grigson (the so-called "killer shrink") as an example of pretextual
testimony. 142 Professors Bonnie and Polubinskaya offer dramatic proof
that politicized state psychiatry in the Soviet Union was
"pathological[ly]" pretextua1 43 in its misuse of the diagnostic power, its
misuse of the commitment power, and its misuse of antipsychotic
medications, t" and then carefully examine more recent developments
that offer a "ray of hope" that psychiatric judgments will better reflect
"the integrity and independence of the Russian psychiatric profession" in
the future.145 Finally, Professor Slobogin demonstrates that the concept
of "amenability to treatment" in juvenile delinquency proceedings is
often a shibboleth for a mix of, mostly, incapacitative and retributive
concerns, 146 and concludes: "[T]he courts' application of the factors that
are considered relevant to the amenability determination is often
pretextual. t47
In short, each of the papers-all written from different perspectives
about different aspects of the mental disability/institutional legal
systems--demonstrate the sanist and pretextual bases of this
jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION
Mental disability law is not rational, neutral, or objective. 148 Rather, it
is irrational and incoherent, and this irrationality and incoherence
disables civil commitment law, institutional treatment law, civil rights
law, and criminal procedure law. There are important exceptions-to be
found in selected opinions by both United States Supreme Court justices
and by other appellate and trial court judges in both the state and federal
systems. 149 But they are rare.
Rather, mental disability law is premised on stereotype and prejudice,
on typification and on fear. It distorts and it marginalizes, relying
141. Sevilla, supra note 12, at 259-61.
142. Id. at 253 n.26.
143. Bonnie & Polubinskaya, supra note 10, at 286.
144. Id. at 280-83.
145. Id. at 298.
146. Slobogin, supra note 9, at 301-02.
147. Id. at 330.
148. I discuss irrationality and law in Michael L. Perlin, "Stepping Outside (The
Box?): Viewing Your Client in a Whole New Light," (paper presented at Faculty
Development Workshop, California Western Law School, Mar. 15, 1999) (on file with
author).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 160-63.
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vividly on the heuristic of the statistically-exceptional but graphically-
compelling case of the person with major mental disorder who is
randomly violent,5 ° and then using false "ordinary common sense" to
justify this intellectual reductionism. These sanist distortions are
sanitized by pretextual decisionmaking that encourages (at the least,
condones) testimonial untruthfulness (often offered under the guise or
rubric of a greater "morality") I5 1 and that teleologically "cherry picks"
social science evidence so as to justify such decisions.
152
The articles in this symposium each focus on a different subject area,
but there is little difference in the ways that courts-and the general
public-treat the various substantive topics. Sanist involuntary civil
commitment decisionmaking implicates pretextual right to refuse
treatment decisionmaking.15 1 Sanist assumptions about the relationship
between deinstitutionalization and homelessness reflect the demand for
pretextual recommitment testimony.'54 Sanist attitudes towards patient
sex may lead to pretextual constructions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 55 And sanism in each and every aspect of the criminal
trial process leads to pretextuality at all stages of such litigation.
156
I am convinced that what I have written about here is only the tip of a
very large and ominous iceberg. Decisions as to whom to apprehend for
commitment purposes, whom to arrest, whom to turn down for
community placement are largely invisible. 5 7 Untrammeled discretion
vested in police officers leads to inexplicable disjunctions in mental
150. At least 90% of mentally disabled persons never exhibit any risk of violence.
See Jeffrey Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community:
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area, 41 HosP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990).
151. See, e.g., Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a
Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 388 (1984).
152. The Supreme Court's choice of sources in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
316-17 (1982) (limiting the scope of a constitutional right to treatment) is a glaring
example of this phenomenon; see generally Perlin et al., supra note 108.
153. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2D-2.1, at 530-33 (2d ed. 1998).
154. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 15, at 128-31.
155. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 28; see generally Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized
Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier? 20 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 302 (1993-94).
156. See, e.g., Perlin, supra note 26 (incompetence to stand trial); Perlin, The
Borderline, supra note 90 (insanity defense); Perlin, supra note 107 (death penalty).
157. See, e.g., Linda Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous
Misconception, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 676 (1985) (persons with mental disability more
likely to be arrested than persons without mental disability for similar behavior).
disability law developments. 58 And the general unavailability of
competent, trained counsel assures that this invisibility will continue
unabated.
Several years ago, I concluded my book on the insanity defense with a
series of recommendations:
First, we must discuss the underlying issues openly. We must openly discuss
sanism, identify it, and explain its pernicious impact on all aspects of the legal
system. System decisionmakers must regularly engage in a series of "sanism
checks" to ensure-to the greatest extent possible-a continuing conscious and
self-reflective evaluation of their decisions to best avoid sanism's power. As part
of this strategy, we must educate judges and legislators and other policy makers as
to the roots of sanism, the malignancy of stereotypes and the need to empathically
consider alternative perspectives.
Sanism infects all aspects of the insanity defense process: legislators, judges,
jurors, and counsel, as well as the media that reports on insanity defense cases.
Each and every one of these participants bears some culpability in our current
state of affairs, and all must bear the burden of eradicating sanist thought and
behavior.
At the same time, courts employ pretextuality as a "cover" for sanist-driven
decisionmaking. Judges must acknowledge the pretextual basis of much of the
case law in this area and consciously seek to eliminate it from future decision
making.
Second, it is essential that the issues discussed here be added to the research
agendas of social scientists, behaviorists and legal scholars .... Researchers must
carefully examine case law and statutes to determine the extent to which social
science is being teleologically used for sanist ends in insanity defense
decisionmaking. They must also study the empirical database that rebuts the
empirical and behavioral sanist myths, and must confront this discontinuity in
their writings. In addition, researchers must enter the public arena, and share their
research findings with legislators, the media and the public.
These inquiries will help illuminate the ultimate impact of sanism on this
area of the law, aid lawmakers and other policymakers in understanding the ways
that social science data is manipulated to serve sanist ends, and assist in the
formulation of both normative and instrumental strategies that can be used to rebut
sanism in insanity defense decisions....
[W]e need to consider carefully the burden of heuristic thinking. Judges, like
158. Compare, e.g., the factual settings in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979),
with Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). Addington-whose case ultimately
settled the question of the constitutional burden of proof quantum in civil cases-had
originally been apprehended following an alleged "assault by threat" on his mother.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 420. Jones-whose case ultimately gave constitutional sanction
to providing insanity acquittees with fewer procedural due process protections in a
retention hearing-had originally been apprehended after he allegedly attempted to
shoplift a jacket in a downtown Washington, D.C. department store. Jones, 463 U.S. at
359. Addington's acts appear to have been more serious (and more "dangerous") than
did Jones's; yet, for undisclosed, and unarticulated extra-judicial reasons, Addington was
brought into the mental health system while Jones was arrested and thus brought into the
criminal justice system.
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the rest of us, use simplifying cognitive heuristic devices in their thinking ....
Recent scholarly literature has begun to carefully assess the impact of heuristics
on Supreme Court decisionmaking; we need to apply this same thinking more
comprehensively so as to assess behavior of expert witnesses, counsel, mental
health professionals and jurors....
Mental disability is no longer-if it ever was-an obscure subspecialty of
legal practice and study. Each of its multiple strands forces us to make hard social
policy choices about troubling social issues-psychiatry and social control, the
use of institutions, informed consent, personal autonomy, the relationship between
public perception and social reality, the many levels of "competency," the role of
free will in the criminal law system, the limits of confidentiality, the protection
duty of mental health professionals, the role of power in forensic evaluations.
These are all difficult and complex questions that are not susceptible to easy,
formulistic answers. When sanist thinking distorts the judicial process, the
resulting doctrinal incoherence should not be a surprise. 159
To what extent are these prescriptions and proscriptions equally
applicable to all mental disability law? It is essential that sanism and
pretextuality be exposed-that they be articulated, discussed, debated,
and weighed. Participants in the mental disability law system must
acknowledge these concepts and must use the "bully pulpits" of the
courtroom, the legislative chamber, the public forum, the bar
association, the psychology or psychiatry conference, and the academic
journals to identify and deconstruct sanist and pretextual behaviors
whenever and wherever they occur. Courts have largely been silent in
the face of institutionalized sanism and pretextuality in mental disability
law cases, and lawyers have been lax in pressing courts on these
questions.
That is not to say that courts have been entirely blind. A recent
concurrence in a Connecticut Supreme Court insanity defense decision
identifies the vividness effect as a factor in developments in that area of
the law. 6 ° Our willful blindness toward new advances in medicine and
psychology has been identified as a major culprit in jurisprudential
incoherence in a Tenth Circuit case involving a defendant with multiple
personality disorder, and the same case identified the sanist myth as to
the alleged short stays that insanity acquittees serve following
institutionalization. 161 In a case involving a tort committed by a
mentally disabled person, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted our
degree of skepticism about mental illness when a person "doesn't look
159. PERLIN, supra note 16, at 440-44 (footnotes omitted).
160. State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 649-50 (Conn. 1997) (Katz, J., concurring).
161. United States v. Denny-Shaffer, 2 F.3d 999, 1009, 1021 n.30 (10th Cir. 1993).
sick." '162 And an Eleventh Circuit judge partially dissenting from an
affirmance in a death penalty case pointed out that "a defendant's
unsuccessful attempt to raise an insanity defense positively correlates,
with a death penalty verdict." '163 But these cases are the exception;
generally, sanism and pretextuality are as invisible in the courtroom as
they are to the public at large.
Heuristics and ordinary common sense are the linguafranca of mental
disability law.1" They set the stage for a system in which sanism and
pretextuality can fester. System participants must listen with a keen ear
for the uses of these distortive devices, and must anticipate their use in
appellate arguments, in legislative hearings, and in public fora.
It is equally essential that researchers begin to study the questions I
have raised here in an effort to develop instruments and tools that can
effectively measure sanism and root out pretextuality.165 And it is
essential that lawyers-both occasional counsel and regularly-appointed
counsel-begin to confront sanism and attack pretextuality as part of
their advocacy role. It is also essential that state-of-the-art research
currently being published by the MacArthur Network be read carefully
from this perspective in an effort to incorporate these insights into a new
jurisprudence. And it is just as essential that scholars locating
themselves in the school of therapeutic jurisprudence integrate sanism
and pretextuality analyses into their work.166
162. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Minn. 1991).
163. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995) (Clark, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
164. See Perlin, supra note 17; Perlin, supra note 60; Perlin, Psychodynamics,
supra note 61.
165. The MacArthur Research Network has recently developed a variety of new
empirical testing instruments to study, inter alia, questions of competence, consent, and
coercion. See, e.g., VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK
ASSESSMENT (John Monahan & Henry Steadman eds., 1994).
166. Perlin, supra note 58. "Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law
as a therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers'
roles may have either therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning
whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to enhance
their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due process principles. See, e.g.,
Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline": Mental Disability
Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and "Them," 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998),
(discussing, inter alia, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC
AGENT (David B. Wexler ed., 1990); ESSAYS 1N THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B.
Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996);
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J.
Winick ed., 1998); David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexler,
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My final recommendation in the insanity defense book was that "we
need to integrate insanity defense insights into all aspects of mental
disability law." '167 I believe the same forces that motivate decision
making in insanity defense law motivate decisionmaking in all of mental
disability law. And the "hard policy choices" that must be made in every
aspect of this area of law cannot be made rationally and coherently if our
thinking is to blunted by sanism and pretextuality.
The daily press illuminates these issues. An article in the
Philadelphia Inquirer, for instance, promised a discussion of recent
plans to close Haverford State Hospital and move some of its patients to
nearby Norristown State Hospital. 168 The spin of the story was this:
Norristown is "employment-starved," and the transfer of patients would
create about 270 mental-health jobs in an economically "beleaguered"
town. Yet, "no one here," according to the story, "wants this to happen."
Said the borough Planning Commission chairwoman:
"They defecate in the alleys. They're shadow boxing... talking to
themselves and fighting with that [imaginary person]. If they're not
taking their medication, they can be quite violent."169
She continued: "I'm for NIMBYism this time (using the acronym for
Not In My Back Yard). It's terrible. I just want them to go right back to
where they came from."'17 And a local businesswoman added, "Sixty
percent of my customers are whacked ... and are either on some kind of
medication or not taking it."17' I cringed, of course, but wasn't
particularly surprised.
Of course, had an interviewee used a common derogatory epithet to
describe blacks or women or gays or Jews or lesbians, a conscientious
copy editor would have caught it, and replaced it with some version of
"[expletive deleted]." But "whacked" was alright, because, somehow, to
speak of mental patients this way was not seen as offensive or troubling
to the same copy editor. And there was no question as to the authority
Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996);
David B. Wexler, Reflections on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995); 1 PERLIN, supra note 22, § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998);
Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 915 (1993)).
167. PERLIN, supra note 16, at 443.
168. Scott Cech, In Norristown, Lamenting the Plan for More State Patients, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 8, 1997, North ed., at BI. I read this article, for what it's worth, waiting




of the Planning Commission chairwoman to correlate failure (or refusal)
to take medication with violence. It was simply accepted as a "given,"
and the story continued in its predicable way. I have little doubt that a
significant percentage of the members of the bar and the bench in the
same town would endorse each of these assertions and attitudes.
A story in the Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, headlined, Mentally Ill
Fall Through Cracks in Law,172 dealt with the frustration that Florida
county judges felt because of their inability to order that certain mentally
ill defendants charged with misdemeanors receive mental health
treatment. In one case, the trial judge sentenced a defendant (arrested
for being a disorderly person) to the county jail for a 179-day contempt
term (the maximum allowed before the defendant's right to a jury trial
would apply) as a means of assuring that he receive some mental health
treatment. According to the article: "[The trial judge] said the law left
him no avenue to [order the defendant to a mental hospital for treatment]
and [he thus] had no choice but to try to get [the defendant] treatment
"through the back door," the jail's psychiatric unit." 173
Here, the contempt sentence was clearly pretextual; the defendant had
cursed at the judge in court, but the story makes it clear that that fact
simply gave the judge a "trigger" to impose a relatively-lengthy
misdemeanor sentence solely as a means of mandating mental health
treatment. No one interviewed in the story questioned the propriety of
manipulating the criminal law in this way.
In mental disability law, sanist attitudes "trump" all efforts at the
creation of a rational, coherent, structured jurisprudence. And pretextual
decisions "trump" the application of constitutional principles and of
constitutionally-inspired (or constitutionally-compelled) legislation.
I selected the specific lyric for my title because mental disability law
has too long been based on "half-wracked prejudice;" prejudice based on
"lies that life is black and white." Mental disability law is still all-too-
often treated by the academy as an abandoned stepchild of criminal law
or family law or health law. Professor George Fletcher expressed his
disbelief that there was any "important article that's been published
suggesting, clarifying, social science, psychoanalytic, or sociological
perspectives on the criminal law ... in a long time." 174 Judge Harry
172. SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 14, 1997, at lB. I wish to thank my mother, Mrs. Sophie
Perlin, for her constant vigilance in searching for-and sending me-newspaper clips
about mental disability law cases.
173. Id. at 4B.
174. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Criminal Courts, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 279 (1993) (quoting Professor George Fletcher, "A Critical
Appraisal of Criminal Law and Procedure," Address at the Teaching Conference on
Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure sponsored by the Association of American Law
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Edwards argued that there are "too many 'law and' scholars," a category
that presumably includes those who write about mental disability law.'75
There is vast array of scholarship-from a dazzling variety of
perspectives-upon which I have drawn, but that remains invisible to
one of the nation's most respected law professors and one of its finest
appellate judges.
There are hundreds-thousands--of reported decisions each year in
mental disability law. 176 The public press is crowded with stories about
vivid examples of violent behavior by persons with mental
disabilities. 17 7 And the Supreme Court, like the moth to the flame,
178
remains fleetingly fascinated with all aspects of mental disability law.
In the end, though, as applied on a daily basis-in commitment courts,
in institutional settings, and in criminal trial calendars-mental disability
law remains the prisoner of sanism and of pretextuality.
My Back Pages-the source for my title-is a treasure-trove of
imagery and lyricism. In the final verse, Dylan offers this perspective:
Yes, my guard stood hard when abstract threats
Too noble to neglect
Deceived me into thinking I had something to protect
Good and bad, I define these terms
Quite clear, no doubt, somehow.
Ah, but I was so much older then, I'm younger than that now.
17 9
The threat of sanism and pretextuality is not "abstract," it is real.
Mental disability law is "too noble to neglect." Our reliance on prejudice
Schools (May 16-21, 1987)).
175. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 50 (1992). But see, Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript,
91 MICH. L. REV. 2191 (1992):
For a discussion of practical interdisciplinary scholarship in the area of mental
health law, see David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing
Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17 (1993). Professor
Wexler analyzes a number of articles--directed to judges, legislators, and other
public decisionmakers-that address concrete problems in mental health law.
Id. at 2196 n.20.
176. Compare PERLIN, supra note 22 (1997 Cum. Supp.) with id. (1998 Cum.
Supp.).
177. See, e.g., Perlin, Political World, supra note 90, at 14-15 (reporting on
searches of NEXIS NEWS databases).
178. See Perlin, supra note 43, at 605.
179. DYLAN, supra note 19, at 139.
and stereotype deceives us into thinking that we do have "something to
protect." And we try, vainly, to define "good and bad" in terms that are
"quite clear." We fail at this task, and we fail miserably, because of the
thrall in which we are held by sanism and pretextuality. If, and it is a
very big "if," we are ever able to loosen its grip on us and on our
jurisprudence, then we all will truly be-in spirit at least-"younger
than that now."
